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e Selfdestruct function is provided by Ethereum smart contracts to destroy a contract on the blockchain
system. However, it is a double-edged sword for developers. On the one hand, using Selfdestruct function
enables developers to remove smart contracts (SC) from Ethereum and transfers Ethers when emergency
situations happen, e.g. being aacked. On the other hand, this function can increase the complexity for the
development and open an aack vector for aackers. To beer understand the reasons why SC developers
include or exclude the Selfdestruct function in their contracts, we conducted an online survey to collect
feedback from them and summarize the key reasons. eir feedback shows that 66.67% of the developers will
deploy an updated contract to the Ethereum aer destructing the old contract. According to this information,
we propose a method to nd the self-destruct contracts (also called predecessor contracts) and their updated
version (successor contracts) by computing the code similarity. By analyzing the dierence between the
predecessor contracts and their successor contracts, we found six reasons that led to the death of the contracts;
three of them (i.e., Unmatched ERC20 Token, Confusing Contract and Limits of Permission) might aect the
life span of contracts. We developed a tool named LifeScope to detect these problems. LifeScope reports 0
false positives or negatives in detecting Unmatched ERC20 Token and Confusing Contract. In terms of Limits
of Permission, LifeScope achieves 85.67% of F-measure and 0.9014 of AUC. According to the feedback of
developers who exclude Selfdestruct functions, we propose suggestions to help developers use Selfdestruct
functions in Ethereum smart contracts beer.
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1 INTRODUCTION
e great success of Bitcoin [41] shows the enormous potential of blockchain technology [9].
People usually regard Bitcoin as a representative of blockchain 1.0 [39], the rst generation of
blockchain technology. In blockchain 1.0, the blockchain technology is usually used to make
cryptocurrency [10], e.g., Bitcoin, Ripple Coin [6]. e usage scenario of cryptocurrencies in
blockchain 1.0 is limited, as the main application for them is storing and transferring values [27].
e birth of Ethereum [11] changed this situation at the end of 2015. Ethereum leverages a
technology named smart contracts, which can be regarded as a program that runs on the blockchain.
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Smart contracts are usually developed in a high-level programming language, e.g., Solidity [14].
e blockchain technology provides an immutability feature for smart contracts, which means all
of the smart contracts are self-executed and can’t be modied. Even the creator of the contract
cannot modify the code aer deploying the contract to the Ethereum. By utilizing a smart contract,
developers can easily design their DApps (decentralized applications) [2]. e appearance of
Ethereummarked the point that blockchain technology upgraded from blockchain 1.0 to blockchain
2.0. By Sept. 2019, millions of smart contracts on the Ethereum [12] have been applied to dierent
elds, such as gaming [7] and monetization [3], with many other application domains under
exploration.
However, the features of Ethereum also make it easy to be aacked. First, Ethereum is a
permission-less network; smart contracts on Ethereum can be executed by everyone, including
aackers. Second, all the data stored on the blockchain, transactions, and bytecode of smart
contracts are visible to the public, which makes smart contracts become aractive targets for
aackers. In 2016, aackers utilized a vulnerability (reentrancy [40]) to aack a smart contract
owned by an organization named DAO (Decentralized Autonomous Organization). is aack
made the organization lose 3.6 million Ethers1. People usually call this aack a DAO aack [1].
Actually, the aack continued for several days and the organization even noticed that their contract
had been aacked at that time. However, they could not stop the aack or transfer the Ethers
because of the immutability feature of smart contracts.
is DAO aack aracted great aention from both academia and industry. Some previous
works [4, 31] advice contracts add some mechanisms to stop the contracts or transfer the Ethers
when emergency situations happen, e.g., a contract being aacked. In this case, the owners can
reduce the impact of nancial loss. Solidity provides a novel Selfdestruct function [14]. By calling
this Selfdestruct function, a smart contract can be removed from the blockchain and all the Ethers
on the contract will be transfered to a specied address, which is an unique identication for the
account2 on Ethereum.
is Selfdestruct function is however a double-edged sword for developers. On the one hand, the
function enables contract owners have the ability to reduce nancial loss when emergency situations
happen. On the other hand, this function is also harmful. e function might open an aack vector
for aackers. It may also lead to a trust concern from the contract users, as the contract owners can
transfer user’s Ethers that are stored on the contract. ese conicting features make the Selfdestruct
function valuable to be investigated. In this paper, we call a smart contract that has been
self-destructed by calling Selfdestruct function as a ’self-destructed contract’. To beer
understand the developers’ perspective about this unique Ethereum smart contract Selfdestruct
function, we designed an online survey to collect their opinions, and to help us to answer the
following research question:
RQ1: Why do smart contract developers include or exclude Selfdestruct functions in their
contracts?
We sent our survey to 996 smart contract developers and received 88 responses. eir feedback
shows that there are six reasons why developers exclude the Selfdestruct function. e top two
most popular reasons are security concerns and trust concerns. Developers are worried that the
Selfdestruct function in their contract will open an aack vector for aackers. Besides, this function
can also reduce users’ condence of the contract as the contract owner have ability to transfer users’
Ethers that stored on the contract balance. To address these concerns of developers, we provide
1Ether is the cryptocurrency generated by the Ethereum platform. An Ether worth $270 on Feb. 2020.
2ere are two types of accounts on Ethereum, i.e., External Owned Account (EOA) and contract account. EOA is controlled
by users. Contract account is controlled by its code.
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ve suggestions in Section 6, which can help developers to beer use the Selfdestruct function. In
terms of why developers include a Selfdestruct function, our survey feedback shows that two thirds
of developers will kill their contracts when security vulnerabilities are found, or if they want to
upgrade their smart contract’s functionalities. Aer xing bugs or upgrading the contracts, they
will deploy a new version of the contract. is nding inspired our second research question:
RQ2: Why do smart contracts on Ethereum self-destruct?
In answering RQ1, we found that two thirds of developers will deploy a new version of the
contract aer the old contract executed Selfdestruct function. We call a smart contract whose
Selfdestruct function has been executed a ’self-destruct’ contract. If the self-destruct contract can
nd its new version of the contract, the new contract is the ’Successor’ contract, and the self-destruct
contract is the ‘Predecessor’ contract of the successor contract. By comparing the dierence between
Predecessor contract and Successor contract, we can identify the reasons why contract destructed, e.g.,
security reasons. We propose a method that leverages a clone detection tool (SmartEmbed [33, 34])
to nd Predecessor contracts and their Successor contracts. en, we summarize 6 common reasons
why contracts destructed by conducting open card sorting [44].
As a result, we summarize 6 common self-destruct reasons, detailed in Table 1. ree of them –
Unmatched ERC20 Token, Confusing Contract and Limits of Permission – might aect the life span of
contracts. erefore, an automatic tool to detect these problems would be helpful to extend the life
span of smart contracts. is motivated us to investigate our third research question:
RQ3: How can we detect lifespan-based smart contract problems automatically?
We designed a tool named LifeScope, which can be used to detect Confusing Contract, Unmatched
ERC20 Token, and Limits of Authority problems. For the rst two problems, LifeScope uses ASTs
(Abstract Syntax Trees) to parse the source code and extract related information. LifeScope obtains
100% of F-measure for detecting these two problems. For Limits of Authority, LifeScope rst
transfers code to a TF-IDF representation and utilizes a machine learning method to predict the
permission. LifeScope achieves an F-measure and AUC of 85.67% and 0.9014 for this task.
e main contributions of this paper are:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst empirical work that investigates the Selfde-
struct function of smart contracts in Ethereum. We conduct an online survey to collect
feedback from developers. According to this survey feedback, we summarize 5 reasons
why developers add Selfdestruct functions and 6 reasons why they do not add them to their
smart contracts.
• We design an approach to nd six reasons why smart contracts destructed. ese self-
destruct reasons can be used as a guidance when practitioners develop their contracts. Also,
our approach gives inspiration for researchers. ey can use the same approach to nd
more self-destruct reasons and apply the method to other smart contract platforms, e.g.,
EOS3 [8].
• We propose a tool named LifeScope to detect three problems that might shorten the life
span of smart contracts. LifeScope obtains 100% of F-measure in detecting Confusing
Contract and Unmatched ERC20 Token. And it achieves an F-measure and AUC of 85.67%
and 0.9014, respectively in detecting Limits of Authority.
• According to the feedback from our survey, there are six common reasons why some
developers do not use Selfdestruct function. We give ve suggestions for developers to
address these issues and to help them beer use theSelfdestruct function in their smart
contacts.
3EOS is another popular blockchain platform which support the running of smart contracts launched in mid-2018.
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e organization of the rest of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present the background
knowledge of smart contracts. en, we show the answer to the three research questions in Section
3-5, respectively. We discuss the implication, how to beer utilize Selfdestruct function and threats
to validity in Section 6. Aer that, we introduce related works in Section 7. In Section 8, we
conclude the whole work and present our future work.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we briey introduce the background information about smart contracts, the Ethereum
system, and some features and knowledge about smart contract programming.
2.1 Smart Contracts
Bitcoin was the rst cryptocurrency that utilized blockchain as its underlying technology. It allows
users to encode scripts to process transactions. However, the scripts on Bitcoin are not Turing-
complete, which restricts the usage of Bitcoin. In contrast, Ethereum leverages a technology named
smart contracts. ese can be regarded as self-executed programs that run on the blockchain. When
developers deploy smart contracts to Ethereum, the source code of the contracts will be compiled
into bytecode and reside on the blockchain forever. e storage of Ethereum is very expensive, as
all the data stored on the blockchain will be copied on each node, a so-called distributed ledger. To
minimize the data space, the source code of the smart contracts will not be stored on the blockchain.
Once a contract is deployed to the blockchain, the contract is identied by a 20-byte hexadecimal
address. Arbitrary users can call the functions of a smart contract by sending transactions to the
contract address.
1 pragma s o l i d i t y ˆ 0 . 4 . 2 5 ;
2 c o n t r a c t Example{
3 add r e s s owner addr ;
4 add r e s s [ ] p a r t i c i p a t o r s ;
5 u i n t p a r t i c i p a t o r I D = 0 ;
6 f u n c t i o n c o n s t r u c t o r ( ) {
7 owner addr = msg . s ende r ;
8 }
9 f u n c t i o n ( ) payab l e {
10 i f ( msg . v a l u e != 1 E the r )
11 r e v e r t ( ) ;
12 p a r t i c i p a t o r s [ p a r t i c i p a t o r I D ] = msg . s ende r ;
13 p a r t i c i p a t o r I D ++;
14 i f ( t h i s . b a l an c e == 10 E the r )
15 getWinner ( ) ;
16 }
17 f u n c t i o n getWinner ( ) {
18 u i n t random = u i n t ( b l o ck . b l o ckhash ( b l o ck . number ) ) % p a r t i c i p a n t s . l e ng t h ;
19 p a r t i c i p a t o r s [ random ] . t r a n s f e r ( 9 E the r ) ;
20 p a r t i c i p a t o r I D = 0 ;
21 }
22 mod i f i e r onlyOwner{
23 i f ( msg . s ende r != owner addr )
24 ;
25 }
26 f u n c t i o n S e l f d e s t r u c t s ( a dd r e s s addr ) onlyOwner ( ) {
27 s e l f d e s t r u c t ( addr ) ;
28 }
29 }
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Listing 1. A simple contract
Listing 1 is an example of a smart contract that implements a simple gambling game by using
Solidity [14]. Solidity is the most popular smart contract programming language on the Ethereum
platform. Users can send 1 Ether to the contract. Once the contract receives 10 Ethers, the contract
will choose 1 user as the winner randomly and send 9 Ethers to him/her.
e rst line is called the version pragma, which is used to identify the compiler version of the
contract. Lines 3-5 are the global parameters, and the function on line 6 is the constructor function
of the smart contract. e constructor function can only be executed once when deploying the
contract to the blockchain. erefore, this function is usually used to store the owner’s information.
Specically, Line 7 stores the owner’s address by usingmsg.sender. (msg.sender is used to obtain the
address of the transaction sender. ) Function on line 9 named fallback function, which is the only
unnamed function of the smart contract. is function will be executed automatically when an
error function call happens. For example, a user calls function “δ”, but there is no function named
“δ” in the contract. In this situation, a fallback function will be executed to handle the error call. If
the fallback function is marked by a keyword named payable, the fallback function will also be
executed automatically when the contract receives Ethers. Lines 9 and 10 guarantee that each user
sends 1 Ether to the contract. If the user sends other amounts of Ethers, the transaction will be
rolled backed by executing revert(), which is a function provided by Solidity. When the contract
receives 10 Ethers (Line 14), the contract will choose 1 user to send 9 Ethers by using function
getWinner (Line 17). e contract generates a random number by using the block info related
functions4 in Line 18. en, the contract sends 9 Ether to the winner in Line 19.
2.2 Function Modifier
Ethereum is a permission-less network – everyone can call methods to execute smart contracts.
Developers usually add permission checks for permission-sensitive functions. For example, the
contract in Listing 1 records the owner’s address in its constructor function (Line 7). In this case,
the contract can compare whether the caller’s address is the same as the owner’s address. Solidity
provides Function Modiers which are used to add prerequisites checks to a function call. A function
with function modier can be executed only if it passes the check of the modier.
Listing 1 line 22 shows a modier named onlyOwner. is modier requires the transaction
creator(msg.sender) should be the owner of the contracts (owner addr). Function Selfdestructs on
line 26 contains this modier. erefore, only the owner of the contract can call Selfdestruct function
in line 27.
2.3 Selfdestruct Function
Selfdestruct function in Listing 1 line 27 is the only way to remove the contract from Ethereum.
When executing this method, the caller can transfer all Ethers on balance to a specic address (addr)
(line 27). en, the contract address will be discarded. If others transfer Ethers to the self-destructed
contract address, the Ethers will be locked forever.
is function is sometimes harmful as the immutability feature can be broken. Immutability
is a special and important feature of smart contracts compared to traditional programs. Once a
contract is deployed to the blockchain, none can modify the contract, even the owner. However,
this function can allow the owner to kill the contract and make the contract disappear from the
4 (block.blockhash and block.number are the functions provide by Solidity to obtain block related information. Since block
hash number is random; so it can be used to generate random numbers sometimes. )
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blockchain. is might reduce the condence of the users, as the owner can transfer all the Ethers of
the contract. For example, the owner can transfer all the Ethers by calling the Selfdestruct function
on contract in Listing 1 when the contract receives 9 Ethers. In this case, all the users are losers.
1 c o n t r a c t V i c t im {
2 mapping ( a dd r e s s => u i n t ) p u b l i c u s e rBa l annce ;
3 f u n c t i o n withDraw ( ) {
4 u i n t amount = use rBa l annce [msg . s ende r ] ;
5 i f ( amount > 0 ) {
6 msg . s ende r . c a l l . v a l u e ( amount ) ( ) ;
7 use rBa l annce [msg . s ende r ] = 0 ;
8 }
9 }
10 . . .
11 }
12 c o n t r a c t A t t a ck e r {
13 f u n c t i o n ( ) payab l e {
14 Vic t im (msg . s ende r ) . withDraw ( ) ;
15 }
16 f u n c t i o n r e en t r an cy ( a dd r e s s addr ) {
17 Vic t im ( addr ) . withDraw ( ) ;
18 }
19 . . .
20 }
Listing 2. The Demo of the DAO Aack
2.4 The DAO Aack - A Motivation Example of Selfdestruct Function
In 2016, aackers found a vulnerability named Reentrancy [31, 40] in a smart contract of the
Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO organization), and this vulnerability made the DAO
organization lost 3.6 million Ethers ($270/Ether on Feb. 2020). People usually call this infamous
aack a DAO aack.
List 2 is a demo of the DAO aack. ere are two smart contracts, i.e., Victim contract andAacker
contract. e Aacker contract is used to transfer Ethers from Victim contract, and the Victim
contract can be regarded as a bank, which stores the Ethers of users. Users can withdraw their
Ethers by invoking withDraw() function. However, withDraw() function contains the Reentrancy
vulnerability in line 6-7.
First, the Aacker contract uses reentrancy() function (L16) to invokes Victim contracts with-
Draw() function in line 3. e addr in line 17 is the address of the Victim contract. Normally,
the Victim contract sends Ethers to the callee in line 6, and resets callee’s balance to 0 in line 7.
However, Ethereum does not support concurrency, which means Victim contract sends Ethers to
Aacker contract before reseing the balance to 0. When the Victim contract sends Ethers to the
Aacker contract, the fallback function (L13) of the Aacker contract will be invoked automatically,
and Line 7 is not executed at that time. So, the Aacker contract can invoke withDraw() function
repeatably.
Actually, the DAO aack continued for several days and the organization even noticed that their
contract had been aacked at that time. However, they could not stop the aack or transfer the
Ethers because of the immutability feature of smart contracts. If the contract contains a selfdestruct
function, the DAO organization can transfer all the Ethers easily, and reduce the nancial loss.
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2.5 Predecessor Contracts and Successor Contracts
Using the Selfdestruct function is the only way to remove code from the blockchain. Aer executing
this function, the contract will be destroyed, and there is no way to recover it. In this paper, we call
a smart contract that has executed a Selfdestruct function a ’self-destruct’ contract. ere are many
reasons why contracts might be designed to self-destruct, e.g., to mitigate a later found security
vulnerability or to enable a later functional change. Many developers will upgrade the self-destruct
contract and deploy a new version. We call the new version of the contract a ’Successor’ Contract,
and the self-destructed contract is the Predecessor contract of the Successor contract.
2.6 ERC20 Standard
Motivated by the great success of Bitcoin, thousands of cryptocurrencies have been created in
recent years. However, most of them do not have their own blockchain system. Instead, they are
usually implemented by smart contracts that run on the Ethereum, also called tokens. To ensure
dierent tokens can interact accurately and be reused by other applications (e.g., wallets and
exchange markets), Ethereum provides ways to standardize their behaviors. ERC20 [3] is the most
popular token standard on Ethereum. It denes 9 standard interfaces (3 are optional) and 2 standard
events. To design ERC20 tokens, developers should strictly follow the standard. For example, the
standard method transfer is declared as “function transfer(address to, uint256 value) public
returns (bool success)”. is function is used for transferring tokens to a specic address ( to). e
ERC20 standard requires this function to throw an exception if the caller’s account balance does
not have enough tokens to spend. Besides, the function should re an event named “TRANSFER”
to inform the caller whether the tokens are transferred successfully.
2.7 Etherscan and Verified Smart Contracts
Although blockchain-based systems like Ethereum store almost all of the data, e.g., transaction
information, users’ balance, it is not easy to search data on Ethereum directly. To facilitate data
search of Ethereum, Etherscan [12] was developed to be a blockchain explorer for Ethereum. By
using Etherscan, users can quickly search the Ethereum blockchain for transactions, addresses,
tokens, prices and other activities taking place on Ethereum. Etherscan also provides many other
functionalities which are benecial to the development of the Ethereum ecosystem. For example,
Ethereum only stores the bytecode of smart contracts to reduce the data size stored on the blockchain.
However, source code is important for code reuse and the development of the Ethereum ecosystem.
To address this limitation of the Ethereum, developers can upload the source code of smart contracts
on Etherscan. Etherscan uses a Source code verication system to verify the source code.
To upload the contracts, developers need to specify the contract address that they want to verify,
choose a compiler version of the contract, and give the contract name. ere might be several
subcontracts in a contract address, but Ethereum only allows one main contract. e contract
name is the same as the main contract. For each execution, EVM (Ethereum Virtual Machine) will
choose the main contract as entry and execute the contract. e Source code verication system of
Etherscan will compile the provided smart contract to bytecode and compare whether the compiled
bytecode is same as the bytecode in the blockchain. Aer passing the verication process, the
source code can be found at Etherscan. However, EVM will remove unused code when compiling
the source code to bytecode. erefore, the verication system of Etherscan cannot recognize the
unused subcontracts.
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3 RQ1: DEVELOPER’S PERSPECTIVE ABOUT SELFDESTRUCT FUNCTION
3.1 Motivation
Using the Selfdestruct function can enable developers to destruct their contracts and transfer Ethers
when emergency situations happen, e.g. a contract is being aacked or is found to be buggy.
However, this function is also harmful for both contract users and contract owners. In our analysis,
we crawled all of the 54,739 veried smart contracts from Etherscan [12] by the time of writing
(for details see Section 4.2.1), and found 2,786 (5.1%) smart contracts contain a Selfdestruct function
in their source code. In this RQ, we aim to investigate the developers’ perspective about using the
Selfdestruct function in Ethereum smart contracts. By understanding the reason why they include
or exclude Selfdestruct functions in their contracts, we can beer understand the advantages and
disadvantages of this function. We then want to design some guidance about using the Selfdestruct
function, which enables developers design a more robust smart contract.
3.2 Approach
3.2.1 Validation Survey. In this paper, we utilize the methods proposed by Kitchenham et al. [38]
to design a survey for collecting the opinions from smart contract developers. To increase the
response rate, we make the survey anonymous [46] and provided a rae for developers who take
part in our survey. Participation in the rae is voluntary; we chose two respondents who provided
their email addresses as the winner, and gave them $50 Amazon gi cards as the reward. We rst
use a small scale survey to collect feedback about our survey. e feedback includes: (1). Whether
the expression about our question is easy to understand. (2). Whether the time to nish the survey
is reasonable. Aer the small scale survey, we rene our questionnaire based on the feedback we
collected. Finally, conduct a large scale investigation to collect our data. 5
3.2.2 Survey Design. To understand the background of the respondents beer, we rst collect
their demographic information. ese ve questions can help us have an overall understanding of
the respondents.
a. Demographics:
• 1. Professional smart contract developer? : Yes / No
• 2. Involved in open source soware development? : Yes / No
• 3. Main role in developing smart contract: Testing / Development / Management / Other
• 4. Experience in years (decimals ok)?
• 5. Current country of residence ?
Aer that, we give a brief example of the Selfdestruct function and ask them the following
questions about this function. e respondents are required to choose yes / no in the question 6. If
they choose yes, they are required to answer question 7; otherwise, they should answer question
8. Both question 7 and 8 contain a textbox. e respondents require to write several sentences to
describe their reasons.
b. estions about Selfdestruct Functions:
• 6. Will you add Selfdestruct functions in your future smart contracts? : Yes (Go to Q7) / No
(Go to Q8)
• 7. Why do you add Selfdestruct functions?
• 8. Why do you not add Selfdestruct functions?
5ETHICS COMMITTEE APPROVAL
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To increase the response rate, we prepare two kinds of survey6, i.e., English Version and Chinese
Version, as Chinese is the most spoken language and English is an international language in the
world. e Chinese version survey is carefully translated to ensure the contents between the two
versions are the same.
3.2.3 Recruitment of Respondents. To receive sucient response from dierent backgrounds,
we rst sent our questionnaire to our contacts who are working in world-famous blockchain
companies or doing related research in academic institutions, e.g., Ant Financial, e Hong Kong
Polytechnic University, NUS, e University of Manchester. en, we also collect developers’ email
addresses on their Github homepage who are contributing to open-sourced blockchain projects.
We collected 1,238 email addresses from Github. Due to the scale of the smart contract projects,
1,238 are the numbers of contributors of the top 100 most popular (ranked by stars) smart contract
related projects. erefore, we believe 1,238 is a reasonable number to support the reliability of the
data.
3.3 Result
Since some email addresses we collected are illegal or abandoned, we successfully sent our survey
to 996 developers, and receive 88 responses from 32 countries (e response rate is 8.84%). e top
three countries in which respondents reside are China (29.89%), the USA (8.05%) and the UK (5.57%).
ree of the respondents claim that they are not professional smart contract developers and have
no experience in developing smart contracts. erefore, we exclude their responses and use the
remaining 85 responses for analysis. e average years of experience in developing smart contracts
are 1.96 years for all of our respondents. As the survey was undertaken in Aug. 2019 (about 4 years
since Ethereum was rst published), 1.96 average years of experience shows that they have good
experience in developing smart contracts. Among these respondents, 62 (72.94%), 10 (11.76%), 5
(5.88%) described their job roles as development, testing, and management, respectively. e other
8 respondents said they have multiple roles, such as security auditor and research.
3.3.1 Reasons for including the Selfdestruct function. 33 of the respondents claim that they will
add the Selfdestruct function in their smart contracts. We analyzed the feedback of these respondents
and summarized ve key reasons. As some respondents give more than one reason, the sum
of these is higher than 33.
Reason 1: Security Concerns. 18 respondents claim that they use the Selfdestruct function
to stop the contracts when security vulnerabilities are detected in their contracts. Aer xing the
vulnerabilities, they can deploy a new contract.
Reason 2: Clean Up Environment. Blockchain is a distributed ledger where each node stores
all the data. Aer destroying the contracts, the functions of the contracts cannot be called anymore.
11 respondents mention that when the duty of the contract is nished, they will call the Selfde-
struct function to remove the contracts from the blockchain, which can clean up the blockchain
environment.
Reason 3: ickly Withdraw Ethers. By using the Selfdestruct function, the owner of the
contract can remove all the Ethers to a specic address. 9 respondents claim this function can
help them transfer assets quickly.
6e survey can be found at: hps://forms.gle/v1N4d8x6syoqoLJXA (English Version) and hps://www.wjx.cn/jq/47005808.
aspx (Chinese Version).
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Reason 4: Upgrade Contracts. 4 respondents said they may need to upgrade their contracts
in the future. Adding a Selfdestruct function is the easiest method to upgrade their contract. is
function allows them to remove the old version of the contract and deploy a new version.
Reason 5: Business Requirement. e business requirement is also a reason why developers
add Selfdestruct function. 2 respondents said their business partners require them to add the
Selfdestruct function.
According to our survey, 22 out of 33 (66.67%) of the respondents will deploy a new version of
the contracts aer destructing the old contracts, whether for security concerns or to upgrade the
contract. Selfdestruct function is useful for contract developers to handle emergency situations,
e.g., when serious security issues are found in the contracts.
3.3.2 Reasons for excluding the Selfdestruct function. 52 of the respondents claim that they will
not add Selfdestruct functions in their smart contracts. As some respondents give more than
one reason, the sum of these is higher than 52.
Reason 1: Security Concerns. e Selfdestruct function can also lead to serious security prob-
lems if the contract does not handle access permissions correctly. 19 respondents are worried
that the selfdestruct function might open an aack vector for adversaries to exploit.
Reason 2: Trust Concerns. 16 respondents who give this reason believe that immutability is
an important feature for smart contracts. Once a contract is deployed to the blockchain, no-one
can modify the contract, even the owner. However, including a Selfdestruct function might break
immutability, which may lead to trust concerns from the contract users. To be specic, Selfdestruct
function allows the owner to kill the contract and make the contract disappear from the blockchain.
Also, the owner can transfer all the Ethers, which raises a trust concern for the user.
Reason 3: Requirement Concerns. 16 respondents mention that their contracts do not use
Selfdestruct function as their contracts do not have Ethers. erefore, they do not need to transfer
Ethers. Besides, when they want to add some new functionalities, they said they could deploy a
new smart contract and ignore the old one.
Reason 4: Unfamiliarity. 7 respondents claim that they are unfamiliar with Selfdestruct
function. ey are worried that they might misuse the Selfdestruct function, and lead to the bugs.
Reason 5: Additional Complexity. 4 respondents told us that they need to add more tests if
they add Selfdestruct functions in the contracts, which can introduce additional complexity to their
contracts.
Reason 6: Additional Financial Risk. Risk of Ether loss aer destroying the contract is also
a concern for the developers. 2 respondents are worried that people may send Ethers to the
self-destruct contract, and these Ethers will be locked forever.
According to our survey feedback, we nd that the Selfdestruct function might be risky for both
contract developers and contract users. For contract developers, they need to pay more eort to
ensure only specic people have permission to call the function, which might increase the cost
of development. Besides, how to ensure no one will send Ethers to the self-destructed contract is
also a big question. For contract users, their balance might be stolen by the contract owners, as the
owners have the ability to transfer all the Ethers.
4 RQ2: REASONS FOR SELF-DESTRUCT
4.1 Motivation
In RQ1, we found that 66.67% of the developers will deploy a new version of the contract aer
destructing the old contracts. erefore, by comparing the dierence between the two versions of
the contract, we can nd the reasons why contracts destructed. Consider the following scenario.
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Fig. 1. Overview architecture of finding the self-destruct reasons
Bob is a smart contract developer. He developed a smart contract several weeks ago, and his
company uses this contract to receive money from other companies. However, they nd that a
function in the smart contract does not limit the caller’s permission, which can lead to serious
security problems. erefore, Bob has to destroy the contract by involving Selfdestruct function and
deploy a new contract to the blockchain. e new contract adds a permission check to avoid this
vulnerability. Bob and his colleagues try their best to inform other companies not to transfer Ethers
to the self-destruct contract anymore. However, it requires a long time to inform all companies.
Many users still transfer Ethers to the self-destruct contract, and all the Ethers send to the contract
are lost forever. It causes a great nancial loss to Bob’s company.
From this scenario, we see that calling the Selfdestruct function may lead to great nancial loss.
erefore, we should try to make contracts robust. If we tell Bob that many previous contracts
are destructed because a function in the smart contract does not limit the callers permission, he
might check whether his contract contains the same problem and can avoid this problem.
In this section, we compare the self-destruct contracts and their successor contracts to summarize
reasons why contracts destructed. e reasons we identify can guide smart contract developers
and help them rene their contracts.
4.2 Approach
Figure 1 depicts the detailed steps to identify the reasons why some smart contracts have been
destructed. Our method consists of three stages. In the rst stage, we crawl all veried contracts
and their transactions from Etherscan. We crawled 54, 739 smart contracts altogether. We found
that 2,786 (5.1%) of these smart contracts among 54,739 contracts contain a Selfdestruct function, and
756 (27.14%) contracts have been destructed. In the second stage, we rst divide crawled contracts
into several groups by their creators’ addresses. In this case, we can nd smart contracts that are
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Fig. 2. A smart contract on Etherscan
created by the same authors. We only use groups that contain self-destructed contracts and rank all
the contracts in the same group by contracts’ creation time. en, we compute the code similarity
of contracts in each group to nd self-destruct contracts (also called predecessor contracts) and
their successor contracts. In the last stage, we compare the dierence of predecessor contracts
and their successor contracts by using open card sorting. Finally, we summarized 6 reasons why
contracts had been destructed.
4.2.1 Stage 1. Data Collection: Stage 1 is used to collect data for the following two stages. Our
data contains three parts, i.e., veried contracts, self-destruct contracts ,and contract transactions.
Veried Contracts: Veried contracts are crawled from Etherscan. To crawl the source code
of veried smart contracts from Etherscan, we rst need to know the contract addresses of veried
contracts. Figure 2 is a smart contract on Etherscan. By obtaining the contract address, we can
easily download the source code, transactions ,and other information of the contract. e contract
address list is provided by Etherscan (hps://etherscan.io/contractsVeried). However, Etherscan
only shows the last 500 veried contract addresses since Jan. 2019. e data used in this paper
are crawled before Jan. 2019. We nally obtained 54, 739 veried contract addresses by the time
of writing. Aer obtaining the contract addresses, we can crawl the source code from Etherscan
directly.
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Fig. 3. Transactions of a Self-destruct Contract
Self-destruct Contracts: Finding whether a veried smart contract has been self-destructed
is straightforward. If a contract has self-destructed, there will be a label (self destruct) given on
Etherscan (see Figure 2). We found 756 self-destruct contracts from 54,739 veried smart contracts.
Transactions: Transactions on Ethereum record the information of the external world interact-
ing with the Ethereum network. All the transactions can be found on Etherscan. We collect all
413,796 transactions of 54,739 veried smart contracts. Figure 3 is the transactions of a self-destruct
contract. In the rst transaction, we can nd who deployed the contract (creator) and we can nd
who destructed the contract (destructor) in the last transaction.
4.2.2 Stage 2. Pairs Generation: e aim of stage 2 is to nd pair<predecessor contract, successor
contract>.
Step 2.1 Cluster: We rst nd the creator addresses of all the 54,739 veried smart contracts
through their transaction. In this step, we inspect the rst transaction of each smart contract as the
rst transaction contains the creator address and creation time. en, we classify the contracts into
several groups according to their creator addresses. If two contracts have the same creator address,
they will be classied into the same group. We only choose groups that contain self-destruct
contracts.
Step 2.2 Rank by Time: In this step, we rst rank contracts in each group by their creation
time, which can be obtained from the rst transaction. en, we can obtain several pairs; each pair
is consisted of a self-destruct contract and a live contract. For example, one group contains ve
contracts, they are contract a,b,c,d,e and these ve contracts are ranked by creation time. Contract
b and d are the self-destruct contact in these ve contracts. Finally, we output four pairs, i.e., (b,c),
(b,d), (b,e) and (d,e).
Step 2.3 Text Similarity: We compute the code similarity between two contracts to identify
whether the later created contract is the successor contract of the self-destruct contract. SmartEm-
bed [33, 34] is the only tool that uses code embedding to nd clone-related bugs in smart contracts,
see Section 7). Although the tool is aimed at nding bugs, their rst step computes code similarity
between the given smart contract and history contracts. We modied the source code of SmartEm-
bed to compute the similarity between two contracts. If their similarity is larger than 0.6, they
might be relevant and we assume the later created contract is the successor of the self-destruct
contract. We also called this self-destruct contract as the predecessor contract of the successor
contract. We found 436 self-destruct contracts have their successor contracts with 1513 <predecessor
contract, successor contract> pairs. We note that 0.6 is a conservative threshold (original paper
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Table 1. Reasons of Self-destruct.
Category Description
Functionality
Changes
Functionality changes for upgrading contracts.
Confusing Contract Removing unused subcontracts, which might
confuse users.
Limits of Permission Adding permission checks for the contracts.
Unsafe Contracts Removing the security problems of the con-
tracts.
Unmatched ERC20
Token
Modifying the contract to make it suitable for
the ERC 20 standard
Seing Changes Changing the seing of the contract, such as
token name, amount of ERC 20.
assumes similarity 0.95 are cloned); we might include many irrelevant pairs in our dataset, but it
will not inuence our result as we conduct a manual analysis in the subsequent step. Increasing
the threshold can remove some irrelevant pairs to reduce the manual eort, but it might make us
miss some true matching pairs.
4.2.3 Stage 3. Reason Generation: In this stage, we aim to nd the reasons why contracts
destructed.
Step 3.1 Longest Common Substring: Longest Common Substring (LCS) [30] algorithm is to
nd the longest string (or strings) that is a substring (or are substrings) of two or more strings. To
reduce the manual eorts, we use LCS to nd the dierent parts of the two contracts.
Step 3.2 Open Card Sorting: We follow the open card sorting [44] approach to analyze the
smart contracts and summarize the reasons why they destructed. We create one card for each
pair<predecessor contract, successor contract>. e detailed steps are:
Iteration 1: We randomly chose 20% of the cards, and two developers with 3 years of smart
contract development discussed the reason why contracts destructed. If the reason of self-destruct
is unclear, they omied them from our card list. All the reasons are generated during the sorting.
Iteration 2:e same two smart contract developers independently categorized the remaining
80% cards into the initial classication scheme. We used Cohens Kappa [26] to measure the
agreement between the two developers. eir overall Kappa value is 0.84, indicating strong
agreement.
Step 3.3 Reason Generation: We nally categorized 6 reasons why contracts destructed. e
information is shown in Table 1 and the detailed information is shown in the following subsection.
4.3 Reasons for Self-destruct
In this subsection, we give detail explanations of the 6 self-destruct reasons and their distribution
in our dataset.
4.3.1 Definitions: (1) Functionality Changes: Functionality changes is the most common
reason why smart contracts destructed. When new requirements appear or some requirements
changed, some developers choose to deploy a new smart contract and the old version of the contract
will be destroyed.
(2) Confusing Contract: Etherscan verication system we introduced in Section 2.7 can lead
to problems. Contracts can add some subcontracts which are never called or inherited. ese
kinds of subcontracts will be removed when they are compiled to the bytecode. However, unused
subcontracts can cause misunderstandings to users. In Ethereum, a contract address can only have
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one main contract. All the other subcontracts and libraries should be called or inherited by the
main contract directly or indirectly. Otherwise, they are regarded as a confusing contract.
Example: ere are four subcontracts in listing 3; the main contract is Crowdsale. Pausable is
inherited by contractCrowdsale directly. TokenCreator is called by Pausable; so contract TokenCreator
can be called by contract Crowdsale indirectly. No subcontracts have a relationship with Token.
erefore, Token is redundant as it will never be executed. However, Etherscan veried contract
system cannot recognize the redundant code and will not remove the code of Token, which may
cause misunderstandings to users that the contract can receive Ethers; as only Token contains
payable fallback function7 in these four subcontracts.
1 c o n t r a c t Crowdsale i s Pau s ab l e { . . . }
2 c o n t r a c t Pau s ab l e {
3 TokenCreator c r e a t o r ; . . . }
4 c o n t r a c t TokenCreator { . . . }
5 c o n t r a c t Token {
6 f u n c t i o n ( ) payab l e { . . . } }
Listing 3. Example: Confusing Contract
(3) Limits of Permission: e predecessor contracts do not check permissions of the callers in
some functions, which can lead to security problems. In the successor contract, they add modiers
to limit the permission.
Example: e predecessor contract in listing 4 does not limit the permission (L2); therefore,
anyone can call the Selfdestructs function to kill the contract. In the successor contract, the function
adds a modier onlyOwner (L5) to check the permission. Only the owner of the contract can call
this function.
1 / / P r e d e c e s s o r Con t r a c t :
2 f u n c t i o n S e l f d e s t r u c t s ( ) payab l e p u b l i c {
3 s e l f d e s t r u c t ( owner ) ;}
4 / / S u c c e s s o r Con t r a c t :
5 f u n c t i o n S e l f d e s t r u c t s ( ) onlyOwner payab l e p u b l i c {
6 s e l f d e s t r u c t ( owner ) ;}
Listing 4. Example: Limits of permission
(4) Unsafe Contracts: Previous works [22, 37, 40, 42, 45] introduced several security problems of
smart contracts. For example, Oyente introduces four security issues, Zeus describes four security
problems of smart contracts (see Section 7). We nd many predecessor contracts contain security
problems like reentrancy, which can lead to Ether loss. Developers usually x these security issues
in the successor contracts.
(5) Unmatched ERC20 token: ERC20 [3] is the most popular standard interface for tokens in
Ethereum. If the implementation of token contracts does not follow the ERC20 standard strictly,
the transfer between tokens may lead to errors. We nd many predecessor contracts are token
contracts but do not strictly follow the ERC20 standard, while their successor contracts follow the
standard.
Example: ERC20 requires a transfer function to return a boolean value to identify whether the
transfer is successful. However, the predecessor contract in listing 5 does not return anything.
Users usually use third-party tools to manipulate their tokens and these tools capture token transfer
behaviors by monitoring standard ERC20 method [24]. If the contract does not match the ERC20
standard, the token may fail to be transferred by third-party tools.
7A contract can receive Ethers only if it contains a payable fallback function.
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Fig. 4. Distribution of the reasons of self-destruct
1 / / P r e d e c e s s o r Con t r a c t :
2 f u n c t i o n t r a n s f e r ( a dd r e s s to , u i n t v a l u e ) ;
3 / / S u c c e s s o r Con t r a c t :
4 f u n c t i o n t r a n s f e r ( a dd r e s s to , u i n t v a l u e ) r e t u r n s ( boo l s u c c e s s ) ;
Listing 5. Example: Unmatched ERC20 token
(6) Setting Changes: Many contracts have some default values, especially for token related
contracts. More specically, token contracts need to set the total token supply, number of decimals
the token use, and so on. If the developers want to change the total token supply, they have to kill
the contract and deploy a new one.
Smart
Contract
--------
--------
-----
Program
Variable
Declaration
Expression
Statement
Identifier NumberLiteral
AST
Function 1
Name
Parameter List
Return Type
Function 2
Name
Parameter List
Return Type
Function N
Name
Parameter List
Return Type
… UnmatchedERC20
Token
Fig. 5. Approach to Detect Unmatched ERC20 Token
Smart
Contract
--------
--------
-----
Program
Variable
Declaration
Expression
Statement
Identifier NumberLiteral
AST
Contract
1
Contract
2
Contract
3
Contract
4 Contract
n
Contract Call Graph
Contract
1
Contract
2
Contract
3
Contract
4 Contract
n
Union-Find Sets
Redundancy
Contract
Fig. 6. Approach to Detect Confusing Contract
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2016.
Why Do Smart Contracts Self-Destruct?
Investigating the Selfdestruct Function on Ethereum 1:17
4.3.2 Distribution. We use SmartEmbed to nd the pair<predecessor contract, successor con-
tract>, and set the threshold value to 0.6, which might obtain some irrelevant pairs. Aer manually
removing irrelevant pairs, we found 351 contracts (some contracts have multiple self-destruct
reasons) for which we can identify the reason(s) why they are self-destructed, and give the
distribution of the six self-destruct reasons in Figure 4.
It is clear that Functionality Changes, Unsafe Contract, and Seing Changes are the top three most
popular reasons that lead to contracts destructed; the number are 156, 95 and 56, respectively. e
number of other three reasons are similar, Confusing Contracts is the least popular reason that leads
to the destruct of contracts. However, we nd that only 12 contracts are Confusing Contracts, and
11 of them removed the redundant contracts in their successor version, which shows this problem
is also important.
It should be noted that it is not easy to nd all the security issues in our dataset. One the one
hand, we only checked the security issues reported by Oyente, Zeus, Mythril, Security, Maian [5,
37, 40, 42, 45]. On the other hand, manually checking for security issues is very error-prone and
time-consuming. To reduce the errors, we utilized tools by Oyente, Zeus, Mythril, Security, Maian
and manually checked each contract it found. We rst use the tools to check smart contracts. en,
two developers with 3 years of smart contract development experience manually identied whether
the results are correct. If the reported results were dierent, they discussed to obtain the nal
result.
5 RQ3: LIFESCOPE: A SELF-DESTRUCT ISSUES DETECTION TOOL FOR SMART
CONTRACTS
5.1 Motivation
In the previous section, we introduced six smart contract self-destruct reasons by comparing
the dierence between predecessor contracts and their successor contracts. Among these six
reasons, Functionality Changes and Change Seing depend subjectively on the contract owner’s
requirements. Specically, dierent developers might make dierent decisions of whether a smart
contract should be self-destructed according to their requirements, even if the smart contracts
are the same. It is thus hard to say these two reasons can aect the life cycle of smart contracts.
However, smart contracts that contain the other four self-destruct reasons might have a short
life span, as they can lead to unwanted behaviors of the smart contracts. Detecting whether a
smart contract contains these self-destruct reasons might increase the life span of the contract.
Manual analysis is time-consuming and error-prone. erefore, designing a tool to detect whether
a contract contains these self-destructed reasons is important. Security issues is a big concept. In
the last section, we use the security vulnerabilities dened in previous works, e.g., Oyente, Zeus,
Mythril, Security, Maian [5, 37, 40, 42, 45], to nd unsafe contracts. ese have already proposed
several tools to detect security issues with high accuracy. e accuracy of Zeus is almost 100%
according to their paper, and designing a more accurate and comprehensive security detecting tool
is not the main target of this paper. In this case, we do not redevelop a tool to detect security issues
introduced in these previous works.
5.2 Approach
We propose a tool named LifeScope to detect the remaining three issues, i.e., Confusing Contract,
Limits of Permission, and Unmatched ERC20 Standard that can lead to contracts being destructed.
Since the aim of LifeScope is extending the life span of a smart contract by nding the three
self-destruct reasons, and smart contracts are immutable to be modied aer deploying to the
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Fig. 7. Approach to Check Permissions
blockchain. erefore, it is meaningless to detect the three self-destruct reasons through bytecode,
although smart contracts are stored in the form of bytecode.
LifeScope detects the self-destruct issues at source code level, which utilizes AST (abstract syntax
tree) to parse the smart contracts and extract related information to detect Confusing Contract and
Unmatched ERC20 Standard. For Limits of Permission, LifeScope rst transfers the contract to a
TF-IDF representation and then utilizes machine learning algorithms to predict this problem. ese
three problems are not only limited to contracts that contain the Selfdestruct function. Any smart
contracts can be analyzed with LifeScope to detect these three problems before deploying them to
the Ethereum.
5.2.1 Unmatched ERC20 token. Figure 5 shows our approach to detect an Unmatched ERC20
token. We rst extract the AST (Abstract Syntax Tree) of smart contracts by utilizing the Solidity
compiler [13]. AST is a tree structure that contains the syntactic information of source code. By
analyzing the AST, we can easily get the information of each function in the contract, including
function name, parameter names, parameter types, and return types. en, we compare whether
related function matches ERC20 standard. For example, if a contract contains a function name
transfer, then we check whether this function contains two parameters and their types are address
and uint256. Besides, the function should have a return value, and the type of return value is bool.
5.2.2 Confusing Contract. Figure 6 is the approach to detect Confusing Contract. We rst extract
the AST of smart contracts. By parsing the AST, we can construct the call graph between contracts.
In Ethereum, a contract address only has one main contract. All the other subcontracts, libraries,
interfaces should be called or inherited by the main contract directly or indirectly. Otherwise, they
are regarded as a confusing contract. In this case, if a contract is not a confusing contract, the call
graph of the contract can not be spied. We use the Disjoint Set algorithm [32] to get the number
of parts of the call graph.
5.2.3 Limits of Permission. It is hard to prescribe functions need to check their permissions.
erefore, It is not easy to detect this issue by using programming analysis methods. We utilize a
machine learning method to predict whether a function needs to check for its caller permission.
Figure 7 describes the overall architecture that we used. e method contains three parts, i.e.,
Dataset Generation, Text Preprocessing and Machine Learning Algorithm Selector.
(a). Dataset Generation: e aim of this step is to extract pairs¡func, permission¿ from smart
contracts. In each pair, func is the source code of a function in the smart contract, and permission
means whether the function needs to check the caller’s permission. Since security vulnerabilities
are ubiquitous in smart contracts on Ethereum [37, 40, 42? ], some live contracts might also miss
checking the permissions of the functions. is situation gets even worse in self-destruct contracts,
as the reason for the destruct might be missing permissions. erefore, it is not reliable to use these
contracts as our ground truth. To ensure the correctness of our dataset, we should use contracts
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that correctly check their permissions for the contracts. However, it is not easy to ensure the
correctness of the contract, and manually check whether a function needs to check its permission
is also error-prone and subjective.
To obtain the dataset, we rst rank all the alive veried contracts by their transaction numbers.
en, we choose all the contracts whose transaction numbers are larger than 500, as each transaction
can be regarded as a test case for the contract. e more transactions, the less probability of having
permission problems, as each transaction can be regarded as a test for the contract. Aer this step,
5,986 contracts remained, and we choose contracts whose balance have more than 1 Ether (e
number of the contracts is 875). As the nancial gain is the biggest motive behind most of the cyber
aacks, a contract with high balance and transactions has lower probability of having permission
problems.
Aer geing these contracts, we rst remove the comments on the contracts and then split the
contracts into functions. We obtain 29,313 functions from these 875 smart contracts. We then need
to identify whether these functions contain modiers, as the permission is usually checked by the
modier. If a function contains modier, we remove the modier from the function. For example,
the original function is function transferMoney(address addr) onlyOwner{}. We remove the modier
onlyOwner from the function and only use function transferMoney(address addr){} to training the
machine learning model. In our dataset, we obtain 29,313 functions, with 4,393 of them needing to
check permissions.
(b). Text Preprocessing: Before training the machine learning module, we need to transfer
each processed function into a set of bag-of-words by the following steps: (i) Tokenization: Each
processed function is divided into a list of words by punctuation and space that usually do not
contain any information. For example function transferMoney(address addr){} will be transfered
into ”funciton”, ”transferMoney”, ”address” and ”addr” (ii) Camel Case Spliter: We separate
function names, variable names and identiers according the rules of Camel Case [16]. For example,
”transferMoney” will be separated into ”transfer” and ”Money”. en, we transfer all the words
to their lower case. (iii) Stop Words Removal: Stop words means meaningless words (e.g., ”to”,
”as”, ”is”). We adopt NLTK (a python library) stop words list in this step. We also remove tokens
of less than 3 characters. (iv) stemming: this step is used to transfer words into their stem
form. For example, ”running” is replaced by ”run”. In this paper, we use Porter’s stemmer [43] to
transfer the words. (v) TF-IDF generation: We use TF-IDF (term frequency - inverse document
frequency) [19] to represent each processed word in the function. is is described as:
wi, j = t fi, j ∗ loд(#o f f unctions
d fi
) (1)
Here,wi, j is the weight of the word i in the function j. t fi, j is the term frequency of word i in the
function j. d fi is the number of functions that contain word i. Finally, each function is represented
as f unj = (w1, j , ...wi, j , ...,wn, j ).
(c). Machine Learning Algorithms Selection: Checking the permission of functions is a binary
classication problem. We tried ve popular machine learning algorithms to nd an appropriate
algorithm for predicting the permission. e ve algorithms are Decision Tree, KNN, Random Forest,
Logistic Regression and Naive Bayes . We found that the Random Forest algorithm obtains the best
F-Score for this task. erefore, we nally use Random Forest to predict whether a function needs
to check for its callers permission.
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Table 2. The accuracy of each machine learning algorithm.
Algorithm Accuracy Precision Recall F-Measure AUC TP TN FP FN
Decision Tree 95.23% 84.91% 82.86% 83.85% 0.9014 363.9 2427.5 75.3 64.6
KNN 91.16% 79.68% 55.09% 65.11% 0.7631 242 2430.3 197.2 61.8
Random Forest 96.10% 95.52% 77.70% 85.67% 0.8853 341 2476.1 98.2 16
Logistic Regression 92.32% 85.73% 58.53% 69.55% 0.7841 257 2449.3 182.2 42.8
Naive Bayes 53.34% 23.32% 92.35% 37.22% 0.6941 405.6 1158 33.6 1334.1
5.3 Result
To evaluate LifeScope, we need to construct a ground truth dataset, which consists of two parts.
e dataset of Unmathched ERC20 Token and Confusing Contract are generated during the process
of nding self-destruct issues (see Section 4.2.3). e dataset of Limits of Permission is introduced
in Section 5.2.3(a). To be noticed, the data shown in Figure 4 are 351 self-destruct smart contracts
that can nd their successor contracts, while we use all the self-destruct contracts as the ground
truth of Unmatched ERC20 token and Confusing Contract.
(1). Unmatched ERC20 token: Our dataset has 756 self-destruct contracts. Among these
contracts, 127 of them are discarded due to the unsupported compiler version. (LifeScope supports
versions that higher or equal 0.4.25). So, there are nally 629 self-destruct contracts in our dataset.
e two developers introduced before manually label the dataset and nd 164 of them are ERC 20
token contracts. In these 164 ERC20 token contracts, 70 (11.13%) of them are Unmatched ERC20
token. LifeScope nds 70 Unmatched ERC20 token, with 0 false positive and negative.
(2). Confusing Contract: We use the same 629 self-destruct contracts as our dataset. e two
developers manually label the dataset and nd 12 (1.9%) of them are confusing contracts. LifeScope
nds 12 confusing contracts, with 0 false positive and negative results.
(3). Limits of Permission: e dataset of Limits of Permission is introduced in section 5.2. We
use Precision, Recall , F-Measure and AUC [35] to evaluate the performance of LifeScope, which are
calculated as:
Accuracy =
#TP + #TN
#TP + #TN + #FN + #FP ∗ 100% (2)
Precision =
#TP
#TP + #FP ∗ 100% (3)
Recall =
#TP
#TP + #FN ∗ 100% (4)
F −Measure = 2 ∗ Precision ∗ Recall
Precision + Recall
∗ 100% (5)
TP (true positive) indicates the number which correctly predicts a function needs to add a
permission check. TN (true negative) indicates the number which correctly predicts a function does
not need to add a permission check. FP (false positive) and FN (false negative) indicate the number
which incorrectly predict that a function needs or does not need to add a permission check. AUC
(area under the curve) is calculated by ploing the ROC curve (receiver operator characteristic).
To beer evaluate the results, we use a cross-validation method of training-testing sets. First,
we divided our dataset into 10 parts of equal sizes. en, we conduct the training using 9 parts
of the dataset and 1 part for testing (2,913 cases for each part). We continue this process 10 times.
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Finally, we use the average results to present the nal results. Table 2 shows the results of ve
machine learning algorithms. Random Forest obtains the best result in predicting the permission
of functions in the smart contracts, but Decision Tree gets the best result in AUC; the values are
0.9014. As a general rule, it is an acceptable performance for a classier if the AUC score is larger
than 0.7 [28, 29].
6 DISCUSSION
We rst summarize the key implications of our work for researchers, practitioners, and educators.
en, we give 5 suggestions on how to beer use Selfdestruct function according to the feedback of
the survey. Finally, we summarize the main threats of validity.
6.1 Implications
6.1.1 For Researchers. Research Guidance. In this paper, we found 6 reasons why smart
contracts destructed by comparing the dierence between self-destruct contracts and their successor
contracts. With the increasing number of smart contracts, researchers can apply our methods to
nd more problems that can aect the life span of smart contracts. Besides, Our study focuses on
Ethereum smart contracts, but many other blockchain platforms also support the running of smart
contracts, e.g., EOS [8]. ese platforms have their own features; some of them also support actions
similar to the Selfdestruct function. For example, developers can use a setcode action to remove
smart contracts on EOS. e unique features of dierent blockchain platforms might lead to having
dierent reasons for smart contract self-destruct. Researchers can use our methods to summarize
the self-destruct reasons on these platforms.
Inconsistency. In this paper, we collected 54, 739 open-source smart contracts but only found
5.1% of them contain the SelfDestruct function. However, in our survey, 38.82% of the developers
claim that they will add SelfDestruct functions to their contracts. ere is an inconsistency between
the practitioner’s perception and their behavior (38.82% vs. 5.1%). e inconsistency might indicate
that many developers admit the importance of SelfDestruct function but they give up on adding it
during the actual development process. e reasons why developers do not add the SelfDestruct
functions in actual developing process might have already been included in Section 3.3.2. erefore,
designing guidelines for using the SelfDestruct function might be helpful. Future work can aim
to design guidelines, development models or tools to address these problems. We also give ve
suggestions in the Section 6.2.
In Section 4.3.2, we use 351 self-destruct smart contracts to give the distribution of the six
self-destruct reasons. For 351 smart contracts we can nd their successor contracts, which means
developers destroyed the old contracts and deployed a new contract. ere are 11 and 19 contracts
in these 351 contracts that contain defects of Confusing contracts and Unmatched ERC20 Tokens,
respectively. In Section 5.3, we found that the number of Confusing contracts and Unmatched ERC20
Tokens in all 657 self-destruct contracts are 12 and 70, respectively. e data shows that 11/12
(91.67%) of Confusing contracts are destroyed by the developers and replaced by deploying a new
one. However, only 19/70 (27.14%) of Unmatched ERC20 Tokens contracts are destroyed and replaced
with a new one. For this inconsistency, developers might assume Confusing contracts are more
harmful than Unmatched ERC20 Tokens. erefore, when developers nd a Confusing contracts
issue, they choose to destroy the contract and deploy a new one. For Unmatched ERC20 Tokens,
developers might still choose to use the contract, and destroy the contracts once the life cycle is
nished. However, we cannot nd their successor contracts.
6.1.2 For Practitioners. Our work is the rst that uses an online survey to collect feedback from
smart contract developers on why they include or exclude Selfdestruct function. eir feedback
, Vol. 1, No. 1, Article 1. Publication date: January 2016.
1:22 B. Trovato et al.
shows that adding a Selfdestruct function can help developers transfer Ethers when emergency
situations happen. However, using this function can also lead to several problems. To address the
drawbacks of adding a Selfdestruct function, we give ve suggestions in the next section. ese can
help developers beer use the Selfdestruct function in their contracts. Smart contract developers
can develop a smart contract according to our suggestions and open source the code for other
developers to use. We also summarized 6 common reasons why contracts destructed and developed
the LifeScope tool to detect 3 self-destruct reasons. Removing these problems might extend the
life span of smart contracts.
6.1.3 For Educators. Selfdestruct is an important feature of smart contracts. However, most
blockchain tutorials focus on teaching how to develop smart contracts and knowledge about
blockchain [22]. Educators should pay more aention to these unique functions of smart contacts.
For example, educators should mention the importance and drawbacks of adding a Selfdestruct
function when they introduce this function. e feedbacks of our survey in RQ1 can provide good
materials for them.
6.2 Towards More Secure Selfdestruct Functions
In Section 3, we summarized six reasons why smart contract developers exclude the Selfdestruct
function from their contracts. In this part, we give ve suggestions about how to beer use
Selfdesturct function according to the summarized worries.
Suggestion 1. Limit Usage Scenario: Adding Selfdestruct function can increase the complexity
of the development and risk of aacks. Some smart contract developers claim that the Selfdestruct
function is mainly used to remove the code and transfer Ethers. However, they do not need this
function if there is no Ether in their contracts. Removing the contracts from the blockchain is
also unaractive to them. Even if their contracts are aacked and controlled by aackers, they
can discard the old contracts and deploy a new version. To reduce the risk and the workload of
development, a Selfdestruct function is beer to add in contracts that contain Ethers.
Suggestion 2. Permission Check: Calling a Selfdestruct function can lead to irreversible conse-
quences. e contract has to check the permission of the caller in each transaction. A common
method to check the permission is recording the owner’s address in the constructor function. en,
checking whether the caller is the owner in each transaction.
Suggestion 3. Distribute the Rights and Modularization: e trust concern is an important
reason why developers exclude a Selfdestruct function. e trust concern contains two parts
according to the feedback, i.e., human related and code related concern.
For human related concern, users might worry that the owner of the contract can destruct the
contract and transfer all the balance if the contract has a Selfdestruct function. For example, the
gambling contract shown in Listing 1 claims that users can transfer 1 Ether to the contract. When
the contract receives 10 Ethers, the contract will choose one user as the winner and transfer 9
Ethers to the winner as a bonus. However, if the contract has a Selfdestruct function, users might
worry that the owner might transfer the money out at any time.
To reduce this kind of concern, we suggest the owner should distribute the rights of calling the
Selfdestruct function. For example, all the users who transfer the Ethers to the contract should have
the right to vote whether the contract should be killed. e voting steps can follow some consensus
protocols, e.g., PoS [18], DPos [17]. Using PoS as an example, the more Ethers people contribute to
the contracts, the more votes they have. is can increase the cost of aackers who want to stop
the execution of a Selfdestruct function.
However, distributing the rights of calling a Selfdestruct function can increase code complexity,
which is also a big concern according to our developer survey feedback. With the increase of code
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complexity, the probability of containing security vulnerabilities is also increasing, which leads to
code related trust concerns for developers. To address these two concerns, we suggest that smart
contract developers can open source and modularize this part of their code (Rights Distribution) to
a library. Other developers can then help polish the code together, and can make the code easier to
use in the future.
Suggestion 4. Delay Self-destruct Action: e Ethers sent to a self-destruct contract will be
locked forever, which increases the risk of using Selfdestruct function. As we described in Section 4.1,
the contract owner might nd it dicult to inform all the users in a short time aer the contract
self-destruct. In this case, some users might send Ethers to the self-destruct contract and this
may lead to nancial loss. To address this problem, we suggest that the contract can delay the
self-destruct action and throw an event to inform the users that the contract will self-destruct in
the near future. On the one hand, delaying self-destruct action can give time for voting (Suggestion
3). On the other hand, it can provide time to inform users that the contract will be destructed.
1 boo l i s S t o pp ed = t r u e ;
2 mod i f i e r onlyOwner{ i f ( msg . s ende r != owner addr ) ;}
3 mod i f i e r s t o pCon t r a c t { i f ( i s S t o pp ed == t r u e ) ; }
4 f u n c t i o n changeS t a t e onlyOwner ( ) { i s S t o pp ed = ! i s S t o p ;}
5 f u n c t i o n moneyRelated ( ) s t o pCon t r a c t payab l e { . . . }
Listing 6. Example: Pause Functionality
Suggestion 5. Pause Functionality: e option in Suggestion 3 and 4 require time to implement.
However, when a contract is being aacked, any delay might lead to enormous nancial loss. In this
case, pausing the functionality when performing the methods of Suggestion 3 and 4 is important.
Listing 6 is an example of pausing functionality. e variable isStopped changes its state in function
changeState, and this function can only be executed by the owner of the contract. Each money
related function in the contract is controlled by the modier stopContract. If the owner changes the
variable isStopped to true, each money related function in the contract cannot be executed anymore,
unless the owner changes isStop back to false.
6.3 Threats to Validity
Internal Validity. In RQ1, we sent our survey to 996 developers and received 88 responses. e
response rate is 8.84%. We used the feedback of these 88 responses to summarize key reasons why
developers include or exclude Selfdestruct function in their contracts. Due to the limited number
of feedback. ere might however still be other reasons we did not uncover in our survey. We
collected all contributors emails from the top 100 most popular smart contract related projects. We
also tried to make our survey as simple as possible and give 2 respondents $50 Amazon gi card to
increase the response rate. We nally obtained a 8.84% response rate, which is also acceptable [48].
In RQ2, we use SmartEmbed to compute the similarity between smart contracts. If the similarity
of two contracts larger than 0.6, we think they are a predecessor contract and its successor contract.
e similarity threshold can inuence the manual eort we need to pay. If the similarity is too
large, we might miss some predecessor contracts and their successor contract. Otherwise, if the
similarity is too small, we need to pay more eort to distinguishing whether the two contracts are
relevant or not. e similarity threshold used in the paper of SmartEmbed is 0.95, and it found
few contracts are relevant if the similarity is lower than 0.7. To reduce the number of unidentied
relevant contracts, we conservatively reduce the threshold to 0.6. We used Open Card Sorting to nd
6 common self-destruct reasons. Due to the limitation of our understanding of the smart contracts,
we might miss some self-destruct reasons. To reduce the threat of human factors, we followed the
process of card sorting strictly, and the developers all have rich experience (>3 years) in smart
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contract related research. Researchers can also use the same method we proposed in RQ2 to nd
other self-destruct reasons in the future.
In RQ3, we use contracts whose number of transactions are larger than 500, and balance is larger
than 1 Ether as the ground truth. We regard these contracts having a low probability of having
permission problems. However, it is still possible we might nd some contracts in this group that
have permission problems, but we believe the number of these functions is small. Since the total
number of the functions used to train the algorithm is 29,313, a few noisey data will not aect the
reliability of the nal result.
External Validity. e smart contracts used in this paper were up to Jan. 2019. Solidity, the most
popular programming language for the smart contract, is fast-growing. From Jan. 2019 to the time
of writing, there are 11 versions updated and released. Many new features have been removed and
added in these versions. Ethereum also might be updated in the future through a hard fork [15].
In this case, the self-destruct reasons might be changed because of a major update to Ethereum
and Solidity. For example, Etherscan might upgrade its verication system. In this case, confusing
contracts might never appear. Addressing this threat needs more research eort, but the method
we proposed to nd the self-destruct reasons is still working.
7 RELATEDWORK
SmartEmbed [33, 34] is the rst tool that uses a clone detection method to detect bugs in smart
contracts. e tool contains a training phase and a prediction phase. In the training phase, their
dataset contains two parts, i.e., source code database and bug database. e source code database
consists of the source code of all the open source smart contracts in the Ethereum. e bug database
records the bugs of each smart contract in a source code database. SmartEmbed rst converts each
smart contract to an AST(abstract syntax tree). Aer normalizing the parameters and irrelevant
information on the AST, SmartEmbed transfers the tree structure to a sequence representation.
en, they use Fasext [21] to transfer code to embedding matrices. Finally, they compute the
similarity between the given smart contracts with contracts in their database to nd the clone
contracts and clone related bugs. Although the tool is aimed at nding bugs, their rst step is
computing the code similarity between the given smart contract and history contracts in their
database. erefore, we can modify their code to compute the similarity between two given smart
contracts (used in RQ2).
Bartolei et al. [20] found that the infamous Ponzi schemes migrated to the digital world. Many
frauds use Ethereum to design Ponzi schemes contracts for earning money. ey manually analyzed
1382 veried smart contracts on Etherscan and nd 137 of them are Ponzi scheme contracts. en,
they divided these Ponzi scheme contracts into four categories, i.e., array-based pyramid schemes,
tree-based pyramid schemes, handover schemes, and waterfall schemes. Bartolei et al. opened
their dataset to the public but do not provide a tool to detect whether a contract is a Ponzi scheme
contract. To address this limitation, Chen et al. [47] proposed a method that uses a machine learning
algorithm (XGBoost [23]) to distinguish Ponzi scheme contracts. ey use account features and
code features to train the module. e account features are extracted from the transactions, e.g., the
number of payment transactions, the balance in the contracts. e code features can be obtained
from contract bytecode. ey count the frequency of each opcode in the contract bytecode. Both
account features and code features do not need the source code of contracts. erefore, their
method can predict arbitrary contracts on the Ethereum.
Oyente [40] is the rst tool for security examination for smart contracts based on symbolic
execution. eir work introduces four security issues on smart contracts, i.e., mishandled exception,
transaction-ordering dependence, timestamps dependence, and re-entrancy aack. To detect these
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security issues, Oyente rst constructs a CFG (control ow graph) based on symbolic execution.
Aer that, they design dierent rules to detect these four security issues. Kalra et al. [37] proposed
a tool named Zeus, which can detect seven kinds of security problems; four of them are the same
with Oyente; the other three issues are failed send, interger overow/underow and transaction state
dependence. Zeus can detect security issues at the source code level. ey use LLVM bytecode
to represent the Solidity source and detect related paerns through LLVM bytecode. Contract-
Fuzzer [36] is the rst fuzzer to detect seven security issues in smart contracts. Four security issues
are the same as Oyente; the other three issues are gasless send, dangerous delegatecall and freezing
ether. ContractFuzzer utilizes ABI (abstract binary interface) of smart contracts to generate fuzzing
inputs and denes test oracles to detect security issues.
Chen et al. [22] dene 20 smart contract defects on Ethereum. ey rst crawl 17,128 Stack
Exchange posts and use key words to lter solidity related posts. Aer geing Solidity related posts,
they use Open Card Sorting to nd 20 contract defects and divide them into ve categories, i.e.,
security, availability, performance, maintainability, and reusability defects. According to their paper,
although previous works dene several security defects, they did not consider the practitioners’
perspective. erefore, they design an online survey to collect feedback from developers. e
feedback shows that all the dened contract defects are harmful to smart contracts. ey assign ve
impact levels the dened 20 contract defects. Defects with impact level 1-3 can lead to unwanted
behaviors of contract, e.g., crashing or a contract being aacked.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we conducted the rst empirical study on the use of the Selfdestruct function on
Ethereum. To understand the smart contract developers’ perspective, in RQ1, we designed an
online survey to collect reasons from developers why they include and exclude the Selfdestruct
function in their contracts. We summarized 5 reasons for including and 6 reasons for excluding
Selfdestruct function in their contracts, respectively. e feedback also shows that 66.67% of
developers will deploy a new version of the contract aer destructing the old contract. According
to this information, we propose an approach that can nd the upgrade version of the self-destruct
contracts in RQ2. Aer that, we used the open card sorting method and summarized 6 reasons why
contracts might destruct. ree of them – Unmatched ERC20 Token, Confusing Contract, and Limits
of Permission – can aect the life span of smart contracts. To detect these problems, we developed a
new tool named LifeScope in RQ3, which reports 0 false positive / negative in detecting Unmatched
ERC20 Token and Confusing Contract, and achieves an F-measure and AUC of 85.67% and 0.9014 for
detecting the Limits of Permission issue. Finally, to help developers use the Selfdestruct function
beer, we give 5 suggestions based on the feedback of our survey and our smart contract analysis.
In the future, we plan to summarize more self-destruct reasons of smart contracts in Ethereum,
as more contracts will be deployed, and new features will be added in Solidity / Ethereum. We will
update LifeScope to detect the additional problems that lead to the self-destruct of contracts.
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